Jack Ryan is famed
author Tom Clancy's CIA strategist who, via a series of spy and military
adventures, becomes President of the United States. We herein take our best
shot at emulating the young Ryan's superior ability to digest chaos and mystery
and come up with order.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THIS
POINT
We've learned that
the AFP is administratively top heavy and grossly underfunded to accomplish the
modernization goal set forward by Congress in 1995. The Navy and Air Force have
been substantially neglected. The Army maintains a force of about 200,000 soldiers,
each with an M-16 apparently, but the rest of the equipment is old.
We can piece
together the following basic plan for the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
our various readings (our analysis and words, not those of the AFP):
- Modernize the equipment of all branches, but
particularly the dilapidated Navy and Air Force, with highest priority on
the Navy due to increasingly threatening incursions into Philippine
Territory by Chinese ships.
- Continue to fight rebel
infestations in the jungles primarily in Mindanao (Muslim extremists and
NPR extortionist gangsters).
- Support domestic needs for
police assistance, COMELEC inspections and disaster response.
Our prior discussion
argued for a smaller Army, less administratively burdened, more focused on
warfare than police work, and better equipped. The Navy in particular needs
beefing up.
The rationale for
scaling down the size and scaling up the capability of the Army comes from a
simple business management principle that "secondary effort, allowed to
flourish, will undermine primary effort."
That is what has
happened to the Philippine military. Domestic needs have taken precedent over
battle readiness. Peter was robbed to pay Paul, or the Navy and Air Force were
ignored to pay for a nationwide domestic Army presence. Administrative
"make work" (parades and medals and lolling about at checkpoints)
took the place of preparation for conventional warfare. The military is
economically broke, strewn all across the nation, poorly armed, and perhaps
living complacently at the top.
So Jack Ryan . . .
er, JoeAm has proposed some radically different ideas to get focused back on
fighting capability. Hey, it may be a pipedream, but the dream is better than
reality as it stands now:
- Merge the three forces - Army, Navy, Air Force - into
one fully coordinated combat unit rather than three units managed
separately and patched together on a needs basis. This is not the United
States with millions of soldiers. There are only about 20,000 Navy and
20,000 Air Force personnel. With separate administrative functions and a
domestic policing agenda riding high, there's not much manpower available
for fighting. So consolidate the back office and support functions.
Integrate the fighting teams.
- Pursue a "missile and
drone" strategy as the driver of weapons procurement. Stop trying to
arm with WWII weapons. Put platforms in place to deliver these weapons:
ships, planes and commando teams.
- Separate domestic needs
(supporting COMELEC, local police assistance and disaster relief) into a
Federal Police separate from the Army, with the Army assigned the job of
fighting via a smaller, well-trained, well-armed component.
It is interesting
that the Army has such a widespread presence on all major Philippine islands.
And almost all Army divisions cite the mission of defeating domestic rebels.
Yet rebel infestations are fairly limited in numbers - small bands - and are
primarily on Mindanao. It is almost as if the Army's national distribution of
troops were for a different purpose, a lingering vestige of days when coups
were just around the corner and the troops were needed either to suppress them,
or to help carry them out.
One would certainly
be inclined to ask if the domestic enemy is really so widespread within the
Philippines? Or the likelihood of coups and civil unrest so strong that a
widely dispersed Army is needed?
Can you maintain a
huge, widespread domestic presence and arm up to face China, or other hard
threats? Not with a budget that must also serve schools and building an
economic infrastructure.
Other sharp
questions were raised by readers during the discussions on the two prior blogs:
Who, really, is the enemy, and what are we trying to accomplish? It was
observed that the island structure of the archipelago mandates a much stronger
Navy, and is in some respects easy to defend.
We will in this blog
reflect on who is the enemy. And we will add to that how the Philippines might
relate to the U.S.
THE ENEMY
We put existing or
POTENTIAL enemies into five categories:
- Semi-Organized Domestic Extortionists: (probability of combat
100%; scope 25% of available fighting forces)
- Muslim extremists: (probability of combat 100%; scope 15% of
available fighting forces)
- China: (probability of combat 10%; scope 100% of
available fighting forces)
- Other Asian state: (probability of combat 1%; scope 100% of
available fighting forces )
- Civil unrest within the Philippines: (probability of combat
5%; scope 100% of available fighting forces)
Lets put some meat
on these bones, recognizing that this exercise is wholly speculative and has no
endorsement or inputs from government officials.
Semi-Organized Domestic Extortionists
These
"rebel" forces eat up a lot of the Army's manpower and budget.
Comprehensive peace is hard to reach because rebel demands are extreme and the
organization is not unified. The persistent success of these gangs at
committing murder, kidnap-for-ransom, and intimidation in support of
fund-raising is testimony to the defensibility of the islands. They disappear
into the jungles or merge with residents and come out to fight at any time, at
any place.
Winning the war will
likely come in some form other than combat as combat can only kill or capture
small pods of rebel troops:
- Peace agreement making
national concessions along the lines of the Mindanao agreement.
- Broader economic
revitalization reducing poverty and discontent.
- Local residents turning
against the gangs.
This is likely to be
a long, protracted struggle. If JoeAm were writing a fictional book about the
matter he'd probably be inclined to structure things as follows:
- Create Federal Police
separate from the Army and make this a police action (also assign disaster
response and COMELEC checkpoints to the Police).
- "Win the hearts and
minds of residents" through economic improvements targeting specific
regions (Northeast Mindanao) and community friendly police work (health
clinics, for example).
- Continued efforts to strike a
formalized written agreement that does not impose unreasonable demands on
the State.
- Make military assistance
available on call when large-scale actions are identified ("bring in
the drones").
Muslim Extremists
Muslim extremists
are attack oriented, keying in on soldiers and also extortion targets
(kidnappings; beheadings for intimidation). The extremists are larger, are
well-armed groups with international ties. It is the international funding and
arming that separates this group from domestic gangsters and calls for
military, rather than police, intervention. The US is already engaged in
support of the Philippine Army with (a rumored) several hundred advisors in
place on islands to the southwest. It is believed that drones are deployed for
eye-in-the-sky monitoring, but not for attack (one missile attack is rumored to
have been undertaken).
Winning the war will
likely come in some way other than combat:
- Peace agreement carried all
the way through, past Constitutional objections (process underway).
- Broader economic
revitalization reducing poverty and discontent (underway).
- Local residents turn against
the extremists in favor of peace and economic development (underway).
China
This is the toughest
one because the threat is pronounced yet may never materialize. The defense
agreement with the United States is the backstop against a major event. It is
in the best interest of the Philippines to demonstrate an increasing ability to
take on her own defense in the event of limited conflict. The direction of the
Philippines under this scenario would be to assume more and more of the
fighting burden and to relegate the US as far into the background as possible.
What may happen
regarding China? In our fictional novel, ala Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan, we might
concoct some scenarios and probabilities as a starting point for refinement
based on better data:
- The Philippines will win UN arbitration; China will
depart from the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ")
peacefully (likelihood 15%).
- The Philippines will win UN
arbitration; China will not depart from the EEZ (likelihood 85%).
- China will land troops on
unoccupied islands within the EEZ and start building residential or
commercial structures (85%)
- China will evict Philippine
residents and troops from occupied islands within the EEZ and take control
of new territory forcibly (5%).
- China will block Philippine
ships from sailing in parts of the West Philippine Sea (50%).
- China will fire warning shots
on Philippine ships to block them from sailing (20%).
- China will fire on a
Philippine ship or ships causing Filipino casualties (5%).
- China will occupy the
Philippine mainland subsequent to escalation of localized fighting (1%).
- China will wage cyber-war
against the Philippines (95% for harassment, 5% for destructive acts such
as bringing down power, communications and other infrastructure).
This is so much pie
in the sky speculation. But at least it starts and organizes a thinking
process.
Other Asian State
If one looks around
the cusp of Asia, in which the Philippines is centrally located, it is
difficult to imagine armed conflict breaking out between the Philippines and
any state other than Malaysia. Relations are generally good and there are few
direct conflicts. Malaysia is on the chalk board due to frictions caused by
Sultan Kiram's attempt to physically occupy land in Sabah that he claims. If
such frictions were to grow more serious perhaps there is a scenario that would
see the Philippines and Malaysia in direct military conflict. It would likely
be a short-term violent flare-up, more pushing and shoving than territorial
conquest. Contingency plans should include this possibility.
Massive civil unrest within the Philippines
It was only a short
time ago that President Arroyo declared martial law in Mindanao. It was limited
in scope and time. On one hand, it is difficult to imagine widespread unrest in
today's civil Philippines. But also, given the public's penchant to vote for
dynastic names rather than platform, it is easy to imagine another
authoritarian president seeking permanent rule, and using the military as his
arm of discipline to quell protest. Indeed, it might be advisable to ensure
against such a scenario by pulling troops back from widespread distribution in
the Philippines to minimize military use during civil unrest. The military
should be staging for the kinds of conventional warfare incidents that are
threatening today.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
Many Filipinos are
understandably suspicious of any relationship with the United States. Feelings
range from outright condemnation of any US military presence to pragmatic
acceptance given China's incursions into Philippine territory.
Sovereignty. Does an
alliance with the US impose on Philippine sovereignty? I suppose it does in the
sense that the Philippines must consider that the US traditionally demands
autonomy over her military. The degree of latitude given to the Philippines to
"direct" US troops would be limited. But presumably the US would
respect Philippine guidance pertaining to activities in the Philippines.
The US has struck a
defense agreement with Korea that puts Korea in the driver's seat to control
deployment of US military assets. It is a model the Philippine might aspire
toward.
One can imagine this
dialogue taking place:
- American
General: "We
recommend flying stealth bombers over South Korea from the US to send a
message to North Korea that they are within striking distance."
- Korean
General: "Wait
one." ("That's Army for give me a little time to converse with
someone.") "Roger that. We agree. When can we expect them to
arrive?"
The American General
would not say "We're going to fly our bombers into Korea." Does one
lose autonomy if one retains approval authority? I think not if that approval
authority is specific and clear.
Or this
conversation:
- Korean
General: "We
recommend flying stealth bombers over South Korea from the US to send a
message to North Korea that they are within striking distance."
- American
General: "Wait
one. . . . Negative on that, General. Our chief says that's too
provocative for us."
Does one lose
autonomy if one respects the partner's stance? Hmmmm. Technically, yes, to the extent restraint of action occurs.
Does that mean one
ought not have alliances?
No. It means one
must be willing to embark on the give and take of decision making with a
partner who may have different viewpoints or
interests, and to remain respectful of the alliance and its overall
value. In other words, don't be a 100 percenter and demand that the alliance
march to the Philippine beat alone.
Perhaps it would
benefit the Philippines to look within and recognize that its own acts can
determine what the relationship with the United States is likely to be. If the
Philippines demonstrates a good grasp of strategies, tactics and execution
during training drills, and becomes and equal partner rather than student, then
the US is more likely to grant the Philippines greater leeway to request and
receive assistance in the form of weaponry or technology or command control.
Autonomy demands
that the Philippines display "world class" fighting attitude and
skill, and the ability to work in forthright partnership with allies.
Forthright
partnership was not on display when the American minesweeper ran aground in
Tubattaha Reef. The Philippine military did not step in to break the
contentious relationship that flared up between Park Rangers and officers
aboard the US ship. Nor did the Americans go directly to some standing military
liaison contact in the Philippines to get relief. It was an acrimonious
incident, not one of partnership. Not one of good, quick communication and
resolution.
You can't have that
kind of separation, and failure to communicate and execute, in battle.
Right now the two
allies are dancing a very awkward dance.
The Philippines can
take control of the relationship if her military leaders demonstrate the
aptitude necessary to command respect from American military brass. A
widespread domestic policing force and woeful sea and air power are unlikely to
command respect among those looking for fighting capability. If blogger JoeAm can see what is going on
with regard to the Philippine military, the US has a crystal-clear insight into
the lack of combat readiness that characterizes the overall capability of
Philippine forces.
The Philippines and
the US do collaborate on strategic matters, but these appear to be in the form
of structured conferences. Formal exchanges and briefings that confirm mutual
interest. But not down and dirty work together to hammer out scenarios, contingencies
and responses. The exception is the fighting of terrorism in the Southwest. It
is difficult to know how that is going and what kind of mutual engagement and
respect exists there.
US/Philippine
training exercises are held regularly to teach troops how to converse with one
another and act as a team on shore invasions or disaster recovery. But how
ready is the PARTNERSHIP to address the China scenarios outlined above.
Somewhere between formal top line discussions of mutual interest and
in-the-field practice there is an arena where battles will be won or lost:
strategies and tactical scenarios . . . and responses. Including the
deceptions and feints that are crucial to good outcomes. And good information,
from drones or spies or reconnaissance missions.
These fighting plans
should drive equipment-purchase priorities. Right now, it would appear that
equipment needs are being driven by domestic leaders tallying up hardware
they'd like, without connection to battle plans.
The Philippines can
drive the establishment of a scenario-driven relationship and retain
considerable authority over the how the fighting alliance will work. Authority
over how the alliance works does not mean cock-fight posturing. It means taking
the initiative to be aggressive about thinking things through, and inviting the
US into the process.
Scenarios and
responses first. Understanding what the US can bring to the table second.
Philippine equipment and training plans flow from that.