Defense III: "Who's the Enemy Around Here, Anyway?"

Jack Ryan is famed author Tom Clancy's CIA strategist who, via a series of spy and military adventures, becomes President of the United States. We herein take our best shot at emulating the young Ryan's superior ability to digest chaos and mystery and come up with order.


This installment of our Philippine Defense dialogue will take its lead from the prior two articles. In the first, we presented a critique of the Department of National Defense layout and goals, and in the second we looked at the component AFP forces of Army, Navy and Air Force. We still have on the agenda dealing with: (a) budget, (b) intelligence security groups, and (c ) relationship with the United States. We'll deal with the US as a part of this discussion.




LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THIS POINT


We've learned that the AFP is administratively top heavy and grossly underfunded to accomplish the modernization goal set forward by Congress in 1995. The Navy and Air Force have been substantially neglected. The Army maintains a force of about 200,000 soldiers, each with an M-16 apparently, but the rest of the equipment is old.


We can piece together the following basic plan for the Armed Forces of the Philippines from our various readings (our analysis and words, not those of the AFP):


1. Modernize the equipment of all branches, but particularly the dilapidated Navy and Air Force, with highest priority on the Navy due to increasingly threatening incursions into Philippine Territory by Chinese ships.
2. Continue to fight rebel infestations in the jungles primarily in Mindanao (Muslim extremists and NPR extortionist gangsters).
3. Support domestic needs for police assistance, COMELEC inspections and disaster response.


Our prior discussion argued for a smaller Army, less administratively burdened, more focused on warfare than police work, and better equipped. The Navy in particular needs beefing up.


The rationale for scaling down the size and scaling up the capability of the Army comes from a simple business management principle that "secondary effort, allowed to flourish, will undermine primary effort."


That is what has happened to the Philippine military. Domestic needs have taken precedent over battle readiness. Peter was robbed to pay Paul, or the Navy and Air Force were ignored to pay for a nationwide domestic Army presence. Administrative "make work" (parades and medals and lolling about at checkpoints) took the place of preparation for conventional warfare. The military is economically broke, strewn all across the nation, poorly armed, and perhaps living complacently at the top.


So Jack Ryan . . . er, JoeAm has proposed some radically different ideas to get focused back on fighting capability. Hey, it may be a pipedream, but the dream is better than reality as it stands now:


1. Merge the three forces - Army, Navy, Air Force - into one fully coordinated combat unit rather than three units managed separately and patched together on a needs basis. This is not the United States with millions of soldiers. There are only about 20,000 Navy and 20,000 Air Force personnel. With separate administrative functions and a domestic policing agenda riding high, there's not much manpower available for fighting. So consolidate the back office and support functions. Integrate the fighting teams.
2. Pursue a "missile and drone" strategy as the driver of weapons procurement. Stop trying to arm with WWII weapons. Put platforms in place to deliver these weapons: ships, planes and commando teams.
3. Separate domestic needs (supporting COMELEC, local police assistance and disaster relief) into a Federal Police separate from the Army, with the Army assigned the job of fighting via a smaller, well-trained, well-armed component. 


It is interesting that the Army has such a widespread presence on all major Philippine islands. And almost all Army divisions cite the mission of defeating domestic rebels. Yet rebel infestations are fairly limited in numbers - small bands - and are primarily on Mindanao. It is almost as if the Army's national distribution of troops were for a different purpose, a lingering vestige of days when coups were just around the corner and the troops were needed either to suppress them, or to help carry them out.


One would certainly be inclined to ask if the domestic enemy is really so widespread within the Philippines? Or the likelihood of coups and civil unrest so strong that a widely dispersed Army is needed?


Can you maintain a huge, widespread domestic presence and arm up to face China, or other hard threats? Not with a budget that must also serve schools and building an economic infrastructure.


Other sharp questions were raised by readers during the discussions on the two prior blogs: Who, really, is the enemy, and what are we trying to accomplish? It was observed that the island structure of the archipelago mandates a much stronger Navy, and is in some respects easy to defend.


We will in this blog reflect on who is the enemy. And we will add to that how the Philippines might relate to the U.S.




THE ENEMY


We put existing or POTENTIAL enemies into five categories:


• Semi-Organized Domestic Extortionists: (probability of combat 100%; scope 25% of available fighting forces)
• Muslim extremists: (probability of combat 100%; scope 15% of available fighting forces)
• China: (probability of combat 10%; scope 100% of available fighting forces)
• Other Asian state:  (probability of combat 1%; scope 100% of available fighting forces )
• Civil unrest within the Philippines: (probability of combat 5%; scope 100% of available fighting forces)


Lets put some meat on these bones, recognizing that this exercise is wholly speculative and has no endorsement or inputs from government officials.


Semi-Organized Domestic Extortionists


These "rebel" forces eat up a lot of the Army's manpower and budget. Comprehensive peace is hard to reach because rebel demands are extreme and the organization is not unified. The persistent success of these gangs at committing murder, kidnap-for-ransom, and intimidation in support of fund-raising is testimony to the defensibility of the islands. They disappear into the jungles or merge with residents and come out to fight at any time, at any place.


Winning the war will likely come in some form other than combat as combat can only kill or capture small pods of rebel troops:


• Peace agreement making national concessions along the lines of the Mindanao agreement.
• Broader economic revitalization reducing poverty and discontent.
• Local residents turning against the gangs.


This is likely to be a long, protracted struggle. If JoeAm were writing a fictional book about the matter he'd probably be inclined to structure things as follows:


• Create Federal Police separate from the Army and make this a police action (also assign disaster response and COMELEC checkpoints to the Police).
• "Win the hearts and minds of residents" through economic improvements targeting specific regions (Northeast Mindanao) and community friendly police work (health clinics, for example).
• Continued efforts to strike a formalized written agreement that does not impose unreasonable demands on the State.
• Make military assistance available on call when large-scale actions are identified ("bring in the drones").


Muslim Extremists


Muslim extremists are attack oriented, keying in on soldiers and also extortion targets (kidnappings; beheadings for intimidation). The extremists are larger, are well-armed groups with international ties. It is the international funding and arming that separates this group from domestic gangsters and calls for military, rather than police, intervention. The US is already engaged in support of the Philippine Army with (a rumored) several hundred advisors in place on islands to the southwest. It is believed that drones are deployed for eye-in-the-sky monitoring, but not for attack (one missile attack is rumored to have been undertaken).


Winning the war will likely come in some way other than combat:


• Peace agreement carried all the way through, past Constitutional objections  (process underway).
• Broader economic revitalization reducing poverty and discontent (underway).
• Local residents turn against the extremists in favor of peace and economic development (underway).


China


This is the toughest one because the threat is pronounced yet may never materialize. The defense agreement with the United States is the backstop against a major event. It is in the best interest of the Philippines to demonstrate an increasing ability to take on her own defense in the event of limited conflict. The direction of the Philippines under this scenario would be to assume more and more of the fighting burden and to relegate the US as far into the background as possible.


What may happen regarding China? In our fictional novel, ala Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan, we might concoct some scenarios and probabilities as a starting point for refinement based on better data:


1. The Philippines will win UN arbitration; China will depart from the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") peacefully (likelihood 15%).
2. The Philippines will win UN arbitration; China will  not depart from the EEZ (likelihood 85%).
3. China will land troops on unoccupied islands within the EEZ and start building residential or commercial structures (85%)
4. China will evict Philippine residents and troops from occupied islands within the EEZ and take control of new territory forcibly (5%).
5. China will block Philippine ships from sailing in parts of the West Philippine Sea (50%).
6. China will fire warning shots on Philippine ships to block them from sailing (20%).
7. China will fire on a Philippine ship or ships causing Filipino casualties (5%).
8. China will occupy the Philippine mainland subsequent to escalation of localized fighting (1%).
9. China will wage cyber-war against the Philippines (95% for harassment, 5% for destructive acts such as bringing down power, communications and other infrastructure).


This is so much pie in the sky speculation. But at least it starts and organizes a thinking process.


Other Asian State


If one looks around the cusp of Asia, in which the Philippines is centrally located, it is difficult to imagine armed conflict breaking out between the Philippines and any state other than Malaysia. Relations are generally good and there are few direct conflicts. Malaysia is on the chalk board due to frictions caused by Sultan Kiram's attempt to physically occupy land in Sabah that he claims. If such frictions were to grow more serious perhaps there is a scenario that would see the Philippines and Malaysia in direct military conflict. It would likely be a short-term violent flare-up, more pushing and shoving than territorial conquest. Contingency plans should include this possibility.


Massive civil unrest within the Philippines


It was only a short time ago that President Arroyo declared martial law in Mindanao. It was limited in scope and time. On one hand, it is difficult to imagine widespread unrest in today's civil Philippines. But also, given the public's penchant to vote for dynastic names rather than platform, it is easy to imagine another authoritarian president seeking permanent rule, and using the military as his arm of discipline to quell protest. Indeed, it might be advisable to ensure against such a scenario by pulling troops back from widespread distribution in the Philippines to minimize military use during civil unrest. The military should be staging for the kinds of conventional warfare incidents that are threatening today.




RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES


Many Filipinos are understandably suspicious of any relationship with the United States. Feelings range from outright condemnation of any US military presence to pragmatic acceptance given China's incursions into Philippine territory.


Sovereignty. Does an alliance with the US impose on Philippine sovereignty? I suppose it does in the sense that the Philippines must consider that the US traditionally demands autonomy over her military. The degree of latitude given to the Philippines to "direct" US troops would be limited. But presumably the US would respect Philippine guidance pertaining to activities in the Philippines.


The US has struck a defense agreement with Korea that puts Korea in the driver's seat to control deployment of US military assets. It is a model the Philippine might aspire toward. 


One can imagine this dialogue taking place:


• American General: "We recommend flying stealth bombers over South Korea from the US to send a message to North Korea that they are within striking distance."
• Korean General: "Wait one." ("That's Army for give me a little time to converse with someone.") "Roger that. We agree. When can we expect them to arrive?"


The American General would not say "We're going to fly our bombers into Korea." Does one lose autonomy if one retains approval authority? I think not if that approval authority is specific and clear.


Or this conversation:


• Korean General: "We recommend flying stealth bombers over South Korea from the US to send a message to North Korea that they are within striking distance."
• American General: "Wait one. . . . Negative on that, General. Our chief says that's too provocative for us."


Does one lose autonomy if one respects the partner's stance? Hmmmm. Technically, yes, to the extent restraint of action occurs.


Does that mean one ought not have alliances?


No. It means one must be willing to embark on the give and take of decision making with a partner who may have different viewpoints or  interests, and to remain respectful of the alliance and its overall value. In other words, don't be a 100 percenter and demand that the alliance march to the Philippine beat alone.


Perhaps it would benefit the Philippines to look within and recognize that its own acts can determine what the relationship with the United States is likely to be. If the Philippines demonstrates a good grasp of strategies, tactics and execution during training drills, and becomes and equal partner rather than student, then the US is more likely to grant the Philippines greater leeway to request and receive assistance in the form of weaponry or technology or command control.


Autonomy demands that the Philippines display "world class" fighting attitude and skill, and the ability to work in forthright partnership with allies.


Forthright partnership was not on display when the American minesweeper ran aground in Tubattaha Reef. The Philippine military did not step in to break the contentious relationship that flared up between Park Rangers and officers aboard the US ship. Nor did the Americans go directly to some standing military liaison contact in the Philippines to get relief. It was an acrimonious incident, not one of partnership. Not one of good, quick communication and resolution.


You can't have that kind of separation, and failure to communicate and execute, in battle.


Right now the two allies are dancing a very awkward dance.


The Philippines can take control of the relationship if her military leaders demonstrate the aptitude necessary to command respect from American military brass. A widespread domestic policing force and woeful sea and air power are unlikely to command respect among those looking for fighting capability.  If blogger JoeAm can see what is going on with regard to the Philippine military, the US has a crystal-clear insight into the lack of combat readiness that characterizes the overall capability of Philippine forces.


The Philippines and the US do collaborate on strategic matters, but these appear to be in the form of structured conferences. Formal exchanges and briefings that confirm mutual interest. But not down and dirty work together to hammer out scenarios, contingencies and responses. The exception is the fighting of terrorism in the Southwest. It is difficult to know how that is going and what kind of mutual engagement and respect exists there.


US/Philippine training exercises are held regularly to teach troops how to converse with one another and act as a team on shore invasions or disaster recovery. But how ready is the PARTNERSHIP to address the China scenarios outlined above. Somewhere between formal top line discussions of mutual interest and in-the-field practice there is an arena where battles will be won or lost: strategies and tactical scenarios  . . . and responses. Including the deceptions and feints that are crucial to good outcomes. And good information, from drones or spies or reconnaissance missions.


These fighting plans should drive equipment-purchase priorities. Right now, it would appear that equipment needs are being driven by domestic leaders tallying up hardware they'd like, without connection to battle plans.


The Philippines can drive the establishment of a scenario-driven relationship and retain considerable authority over the how the fighting alliance will work. Authority over how the alliance works does not mean cock-fight posturing. It means taking the initiative to be aggressive about thinking things through, and inviting the US into the process.


Scenarios and responses first. Understanding what the US can bring to the table second. Philippine equipment and training plans flow from that.

Defense Part II: Army, Navy, Air Force

105 Howitzer

The first article in this series presented an overview of the Philippine Department of National Defense, the civilian organization responsible for articulating a following through on laws aimed at building a strong military. The essential question is, how prepared is the nation to defend itself? The answer, subject to further enlightenments as we proceed, appears to be "not very". The reasons for the answer: (1) only 10% of the needed P331 billion budget for improvement has been allocated, and (2) the heavy administrative structure moves money to non-fighting purposes.

In this article, we will profile the main fighting units, army, navy and air force, looking at structure, mission and resources. JoeAm will make observations along the way. If you find the detail too mundane, please skip to the last section where JoeAm thinks outside the box.  

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP)

This matrix organization pulls all military forces together under a command structure covering seven geographic regions of the Philippines, plus a National Development Support Command. There are also 16 support units.  Here is a sample mission from the Central Command:

• Central Command Mission: To conduct joint operations against threats in the Visayas in order to establish a Peaceful and Secured environment, and assist the Local Government Agencies in their Socio-Economic, Ecological and Developmental Activities.

AFP is led  by the following people:

• Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, Chief of Staff, AFP
• Lt. Gen. Alan R Luga, Vice Chief of Staff, AFP
• Lt. Gen. Gregorio E. Macapagal, Deputy Chief of Staff, AFP
• CMS Guillermo C. Francisco, Sergeant Major, AFP
• VAdm Jose Luis M. Alano, Flag Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy
• Lt. Gen. Noel A. Coballes, Commanding General, Philippine Army
• Lt. Gen Lauro Catalino G. Dla Cruz, Commanding General, Philippine Air Force

The unified command centers are:

• National Capitol Region
• Northern Luzon
• Southern Luzon
• Central
• Western
• Eastern Mindanao
• Western Mindanao
• National Development Support

JoeAm Observations:  The number of coordination, administrative and support units that are behind the fighting troops makes for one huge body of soldiers not bearing arms. Clothing. Meals. Beds. Equipment. Transportation. Wow.

ARMY

• Vision:  A world-class Army that is a source of national pride.

• Mission: To organized, train equip, deploy, and sustain ground forces in support of the AFP mission. 

•  ISO (Internal Security Operations) Mission: To organize, train, equip, deploy and sustain ground forces to defeat the CTM by 2010, destroy the ASG and contain the SPSG in order to establish a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to national development.

• Function: Organize, train and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land;  Prepare such units as may be necessary for the effective prosecution of national defense plans and programs and Armed Forces mission, including the expansion of the peacetime ARMY component to meet any emergency; Develop, in accordance with the other Major Services, tactics, techniques and equipment of interest to the Army on field operations; Train, organize and equip all ARMY reserve units; and Perform such functions as the higher authorities may direct.

JoeAm Observations: "World class" is difficult to attain. The nation has too many demands on its budget to build a sophisticated army. It may be a more realistic vision to develop highly capable tactical or strike forces rather than masses of well-armed troops. And pride as an objective? How about ability to defend? The ISO mission recognizes that internal threats are the real threats of today, but clearly there is also awareness that external threats exist ( see Light Armor's stated transition to conventional warfare capability).

Major Units

• 1st Infantry (Tabak) Division, Pa, Location: Kuta Major Cesar L Sang-an, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. Mission:  Conducts Internal Security Operations (ISO) in the AOR to dismantle and destroy the remaining guerilla fronts of the LCM, the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group in order to attain peace and stability conducive to sustainable development; assists  the  government  in  its  socio-economic development projects; and assists the PNP curb criminalities in the AOR.

• 2nd Infantry Division : Location: Tanay, Rizal. Mission:  "Conduct sustained Internal Security Operations (ISO) in regions 4A and 4B to neutralize the Southern Tagalog Regional Party Committee (STRPC) and the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New Peoples Army (NPA) in order to create a physically and psychologically sound environment conducive for development and commerce." Known as the Jungle Fighter Division, 2nd Division is the Philippine Army's primary Infantry unit specializing in jungle warfare. [Wiki]

• 3rd Infantry Division: Mission: Conducts support operations in Western Visayas (Negros Occidental and, Panay and Guimaras Islands ), Negros Oriental and Suiquijor Island to "Win the Peace" 01 January 2011 to 31 December 2016 in order to help create an environment conducive for sustainable development and a just and lasting peace in the area. (JoeAm Note: headquarters has 100 positions assigned per web page; these are mainly coordination and special staff.)

• 4th Infantry (Diamond) Division: Mission: Conducts sustained IPSO to clear the AOR of CNN affectation and significantly degrade the armed capability of NEMRC, NCMRC, and part of SMRC effective 01 January 2011 to help the LGU's to maintained (sic) an environment conducive to sustainable development and a Just and Lasting peace by 2016. AOR: see map.

Who needs jets when you've got this?

• 5th Infantry Division: Mission: Conduct internal security operations in the Ilocos, Cagayan Valley, and Cordillera Administrative Regions to destroy the communist terrorists and other threat groups in order to establish a physically and psychologically secured environment conducive to economic development. AOR: see map. Camp: Photos feature recreation facilities including golf course, bar and swimming pool.

• 6th Infantry (Kampilan) Division: Location: Central Mindanao. Slogan: "Winning the Peace through Unity and Progress".

• 7th Infantry Division: (2 subsidiary sites; no Div. site): 702nd Infantry (Defender) Brigade:  "For the past 23 years, the 702nd Infantry (DEFENDER) Brigade has devotedly and selflessly served the people within its Area of Responsibility within the areas of Central Luzon. Currently located at Brgy Calaanan, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija . . . " 703rd (Agila) Brigade: Mission:  Conducts ISO to clear the remaining CTM affected areas in AOR NLT Yearend 2011 and prevent resurgence at cleared areas through holding operations in order to establish a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to development. AOR: Provinces of Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales, Tarlac, Pangasinan , La union, Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte.

• 8th Infantry (Stormtroopers) Division:  AOR: Eastern Visayas (Islands of Samar, Leyte and Biliran). Mission: Conducts Internal Security Operations (ISO) in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) to dismantle and destroy the remaining guerilla fronts of the Local Communist Movement (LCM) in order to attain peace and stability conducive to sustainable development in assisting the Philippine government in its socio-economic development projects; and assists the Philippine National Police curb criminality in the Visayas Region. [Wiki]

• 9th Infantry (Spear) Division: (Web access denied.  "You don't have permission to access . . .") Location:  Bicol Region.  Mission:  conduct sustained Internal Security Operations (ISO) in the Bicol region, excluding Masbate (8ID), to neutralize the Southern Tagalog Regional Party Committee (STRPC) and the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New Peoples Army (NPA) in order to create a physically and psychologically sound environment conducive for development and commerce of the Bicol Region. [Wiki]

• 10th Infantry (Agila) Division: AOR: 6 provinces, namely: Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley Province, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Sarangani and South Cotabato and the chartered cities of Davao and General Santos. 

• Light Armor Division: Vision: A modern, dynamic and relevant light armor division. Mission: To organize, train, equip, provide and sustain armor forces in the conduct of support operations to "Win the Peace" in order to help the Filipino nation create an environment conducive to sustainable development and just and lasting peace.  Units: Today, the Division maintains five (5) Light Armor Battalions, three (3) Mechanized Infantry Battalions, two (2) separate Light Armor Companies deployed in various parts of the archipelago, one (1) Aviation Battalion stationed in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, an Armor Maintenance Battalion, a Headquarters and Headquarters Service Battalion, a Signal Company, an engineer Combat Company and the Armor School, 1ACT, all based in Camp O’Donnell, Capas, Tarlac. New Role:  In Line with the Army Modernization Plan, the Armor Division at the advent of the 21st Century, would be geared towards it new role – conventional warfare combat arms. Assets: Armor Personnel Carrier (APC), Commando V-150, Simba AFV, Scorpion CVR

• 3rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion: (No web site) Location: Mindanao. Mission: Organize, train, equip, deploy and sustain armor forces to defeat the CTM by 2010, destroy the ASG and contain the SPSG in order to establish physically and psychologically secured environment conducive to national development.

• Other Units: A number of significant service and support units: reserves, engineers, munitions, hospitals, materiel, etc..

Personnel: 200,000+ active duty; 170,000 reserves. [Wiki]

Armaments [Wiki]

• Armored Vehicles: 560, some as old as 1967; some assigned to Marines, most to Army
• Artillery: 270 cannons (155 and 105 mm); 70+ mortars; most delivered 1950's to 1980's
• Aircraft: 8 light airplanes (e.g., Cessna)
• Small Arms: mainly 200,000 M-16's; various other light weapons.

JoeAm Observations: The Army has become an effective jungle fighting force and has a broad presence in the remote areas where rebel and terrorist organizations operate. It is dangerous work, and the Army succeeds in keeping armed unrest to a minimum. These forces deserve utmost respect and appreciation. A cynic is inclined to ask, however, given the shortage of money whether golf courses, web sites dedicated to self-appreciation, and parades are the highest and best use of funds. The Army also provides disaster relief, supports local police to fight crime, and mans COMELEC check points during elections, all non-combat functions.

NAVY

The Philippine Navy is the focus of attention now to upgrade defense capabilities in the West Philippine Sea. Two small fighting ships (cutters) have been obtained. A third is in the plan but has been deferred so that money can be better spent arming the first two.

• Web Site: Thin with little information. Home page emphasizes recruitment. The web site contains no mission statement. This slogan is at the foot of the web site:  "Strong and Credible Navy for a Progressive Maritime Philippines". Reference is made to a "Navy Sail Plan 2020", but it is not published on the site.

• Organization: There are two major operating units, (1) the sailing fleet, and (2) the marines. Resources are organized under seven regional commands corresponding to the AFP unified command geographic regions supported by five support commands and eight support units.

• Bases: There are three naval bases (Cavite, San Vicente, Mactan), and 15 naval stations distributed across the Philippines. There are five marine corp bases.

• Personnel:  21, 957 [Wiki]

• Equipment:

• On Hand: three frigates,  eleven corvettes, "numerous" patrol boats, eleven amphibious landing ships and five auxiliary ships. [Wiki]

• Modernization Program:

• Hamilton class cutter: two obtained; a third deferred pending arming of the first two.
• Multi-purpose attack craft: six obtained so far; 42 planned. They haul 16 troops, two tons of supplies, and each has a 50 caliber and two smaller machine guns.
• Landing craft utility: One
• Offshore patrol vessel: None obtained; three in the plan.
• Under consideration: support and multi-purpose vessels; submarine
• Helicopters: Only one on hand. Target is 18 including 2 anti-submarine attack helicopters.
• Deep water patrol vessel (frigate): One under consideration

AIR FORCE

The organization of the Air Force units is not clear. Wiki presents a 2006 organization chart which does not appear to be the same as recorded on the Air Force web site.  Some units appear to have been deactivated, although they are still shown on the web site (15h Strike Wing; dissolved due to lack of aircraft in 2010). The truth and travails are reflected in this snapshot in the Air Force history profile:

•  Embracing the core values of IN-STEP – Integrity, Service above Self, Teamwork, Excellence and Professionalism – the leadership resolved to develop and arrest mediocrity at all levels. To sustain this, for the last three years, the modest acquisition was complemented by a structured system of strategic planning and redefined training programs alongside the widespread updating of manuals and other documents that focused on the dictates of service - advocating peace, progress and unity. Hammering down on pronounced core competencies and core values, the present airmen and airwomen created opportunities for the PAF to show its decisive will to succeed, driven and honorable despite and in spite of present realities and pronounced difficulties.

Philippine Air Bases

Little information is readily available about Air Force units, reflecting the cash-strapped condition of this branch of service.

• 1st Air Division:  Mission " . . . vital role on the internal security operations of the AFP . . . Its area of responsibility is now confined to the whole of the Luzon only, not nationwide as before. . . . Command and control over five (5) Tactical Operations Groups: TOG 1 in Loakan, Baguio City; TOG 2 in Cauayan, Isabela; TOG 3 in San Miguel, Tarlac; TOG 4 in Lucena City; and TOG 5 in Legaspi City and the 600th Air Base Wing, which maintains and secures Clark Air Base in Angeles City, Pampanga, where the Division headquarters is currently based." Vision: Given the new mission in Luzon in support to two major AFP Unified Commands, the 1st Air Division envisions to be a multi-dimensional force with vigilant air power and reach that can provide decisive and precise effects on all types of threats to national security through the employment of credible air power either on land, air or sea.

• 2nd Air Division: ("Forbidden to access this web site").

• 3rd Air Division: (No web site).

• 205th Tactical Helicopter Wing: (No web connectivity).

• Personnel: 17,000 [Wiki]

• Aircraft On Hand: [Wiki]
• Light Attack/Trainer Jet: 5
• Light Attack/Observation/Trainer Prop: 50
• Transport: 7
• Light Observation/Training: 32
• Helicopters: 93

• Upgrade Plan: [Wiki]
• Jet Fighters: maintenance  expense for 12 US F-16s deemed too high; attention is now on light training jets, converted to fight;12 FA-50 units from South Korea are being purchased as first step
• Helicopters: 25 being acquired; attack and service
• Others: a variety of transports, trainers, utility aircraft, and helicopters are being purchased or considered to fill certain support needs

ANALYSIS AND OUT OF THE BOX THINKING

Let's consider these military units from the perspective of past, present and future:

Past

The structure of the Philippine military is similar to that of America or other warmongering states of the 20th century, with three main components defined by their equipment and place of fighting:

• Army, on the land with land machines and guns
• Navy, on the sea with water machines and guns
• Air Force, in the skies with air machines and guns

The Air Force and Navy give meaning to the term "dilapidated". Run down from benign neglect.

Present

Schools or guns? We are not at war, at least externally; schools are more important. The Philippine government cannot fund robust build-up of military strength. Old equipment is getting very old. New equipment is being ordered unit by unit with approval going all the way to the top, the President, because equipment is expensive and it becomes a national budgeting decision. So F-16 jets are scrapped in favor of jet trainers and two Navy cutters are ordered rather than three.

The army gets huge resources, as it has a triple function:

• Fighting rebels and terrorists
• Domestic support: Helping the police deal with criminals  and manning COMELEC check points
• Disaster response

It is easy to question whether Army resources are applied well. We see pictures of golf courses and see all the parades and award ceremonies prominantly featured on web sites and note that there are many cross-command administrative units that do not go into the field. So there would appear to be a LOT of administrative padding among the 200,000 active duty soldiers. How many fighters do you estimate there are? A few thousand?

Future

The course that the Philippines is pursuing is to build defense capabilities slowly, within available resources. Specifically, the goal is to acquire equipment. There is plenty of manpower available.

This is a reasonable approach. But what if we paused to reflect on what is happening in the world of military fighting. For brevity, let's note two profound trends in fighting:

• It is a world of missiles in place of cannons and bombs
• It is a world of drones in place of feet on the ground
• In 20 years, it will be a world of laser weapons in place of missiles

Missiles and drones work on land, at sea and in the air. Why should the military structure be of World War II design based on land, water and air equipment, with administrative multipliers to coordinate? Why is there not a single unified "Missile Command" with land vehicles, ships and airplanes being merely a part of the delivery platform - offense or defense - to support that master weapon strategy??

• Like get rid of all the extra layers of  coordination staff and swimming pools and buy missiles.

And drones are powerful, powerful machines. Little ones with cameras, big ones with missiles. Why is the Philippines not leapfrogging past artillery, armored personnel carriers and jets to get to drones? Indeed, we can adjust the name of our force to be the "Missile and Drone Command" or simply "Military Command".

• Like, buy drones instead of jet trainers and cannons. Stop camping troops in the jungle where they are vulnerable to assault.

With advanced missile and drone capabilities, the Philippines can reduce its fighting labor, the troops on the ground. Oh, yes, troops are needed to support the battle plan, or do the drone body counts. But these should be specialized commandos, jungle guys, cave crawlers. Not parade-ground warriors marching all aligned, petty boys making the generals happy (I exaggerate for literary effect). ALL command centers are fully integrated commands, using land, sea or air resources as necessary, all able to order from the same quartermaster, procure from the same procurement center, and talk on the same radio frequency. Like, on the same team. Not patched together by coordination administrators.

• Like, trim the ground troops down to a few companies of hard-nosed commandos who operate under the umbrella of missiles and drones. Mobile, in and out. Well equipped. Lean and mean strike teams. Hard-trained for fighting, not wasted manning checkpoints.

If you need a national police force to fight criminals and help with elections, or a disaster force to rescue people, call them by a different name. Don't call them Army. Call them Federal Police or something.

Army should be the fighting men and women.

It's a pride thing. A focus thing. A motivation thing. A commitment thing. A skill and training thing.

And if your argument is "we have too much invested in the current infrastructure; it is not feasible to take it apart", I would ask.

• Are you really interested in defending the Philippines? Or is it good enough to see this laggardly catch-up go on year after year?

A nation with limited resources cannot compete on a level playing field with the big guys. It has to be smarter, more precise, stronger and meaner. Hit hard, hit fast. In, out, hit again. Like Pacquiao fighting a big guy, you  follow?

I'll elaborate on this in a future blog. Just thinking out loud . . . one hand on the keyboard, the other on the coffee mug . . .

Department of Defense Part I: Mission and Goals

While the rest of you opinion mongers are dealing with elections, I'd like to get down and dirty with Philippine defense. How is this animal called the Department of National Defense ("DND") put together and how ready is it to wage war? With respect to the last question, what is the relationship with the United States?

We will ask hard questions because defense is one area where pussy-footing around politely will not get the job done. Diplomacy is for diplomats. Waging war is for brutally frank truth-tellers.

"You idiot, Joe. We can't wash our national secrets in the public laundry, and we can't be calling China a bully in a government web site. Get real! Get a life!"

Ah, I stand corrected. We do need to be diplomatic, and we can't reveal state secrets. But we should not blow smoke at our citizens or mislead them about their security.

The Department of National Defense has many subordinate functions and offices or bureaus. They are detailed below. These are very important functions, but one is inclined to ask, is the Department mainly administrative in focus, dealing with all the ancillary businesses of defense from veterans affairs to medical units and schools, or are these units in place to support a finely honed fighting force? Are efforts administrative and self-perpetuating with lots of nice jobs, with maybe a little corruption tossed into the mix. Or is DND ready to attack and defend? 

It is just a question.

Perhaps with a little bias written in.

The five crucial components that will be examined further using information that is available on the internet are:

• Budget (e.g., allocations for admin vs. troops if available)
• Defense Intelligence Security Group: purpose and activities
• Plans and projects; strategy
• Armed Forces of the Philippines
• Relationship with the United States

In today's article, we will set the scene by looking at the organization of the DND and its mission and goals. Original text from DND documents are italicized.

The Defense Bureaucracy

Here are key positions shown on the DND organization chart. Commentary is interjected now and then to raise important issues.

• Office of the Secretary

• Spokesmen and other administrative staff to Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin. 
• The one non-administrative position is of considerable importance. It seems to be comparable to the US CIA: The Group Commander, Defense Intelligence Security Group ("DISG"), headed by Major Ramon Antonio E. Bello Pa.

• Under-Secretaries

• These are heads of a variety of functions: (a) defense, (b) finance and materials, (c ) legal and strategic affairs,  and (d) civil, veterans and reserve affairs.
• They seem to duplicate other sets of leaders; it is difficult to distinguish their responsibilities from those of the Assistant Secretaries and DND bureaus that follow.

• Assistant Secretaries ("AS")

• Functional heads: (a) personnel, (b) finance, (c ) plans & programs, (d) strategic assessment, (e) acquisition, installations & logistics.
• The two functions that would seem to play crucial roles in defining the China situation and how to structure a U.S. role would be: AS Danilo Francia who heads plans and programs, and AS Raymund Quilop who heads strategic assessment.

• Executive /Service Staff

• Information management, public affairs, administrative services and legal services.

• Other Directors in the DND Proper

• Five directors whose roles are not stated in this document.

• DND Bureaus

• 13 Bureaus that do defense work: the military units, veterans affairs, civil defense, arsenals,  the National Defense College, and medical centers.
• The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, is General Emmanuel T. Bautista.

• Others

• DND Ombudsman, audit, shrine curator and CSC/DND field office.

If I read this correctly, the Secretary of National Defense has over 40 people reporting to him. That is unmanageable. Maybe they report in some chain of command, but that is not shown. My impression is "rat's nest of overlapping responsibilities".

Mission and Values; Objectives

There are separate statements for "Mandate", "Mission", and "Vision". The mandate and mission say pretty much the same thing and the vision provides a future direction.

• Mission: “to guard against external and internal threats to national peace and security, promote the welfare of soldiers, veterans and their families in order to attain national security, uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity, support socio- economic development and political stability”.

• Vision: "A transformed National Defense establishment in the 21st century: a strategic partner of the International Community, capable and responsive, professional and competent, effective and efficient in meeting external and internal challenges to national security and domestic stability as well as contributing to the social and economic development of the Philippines”.

Those are excellent framing statements. The DND also sets forth clearly the Department's values and objectives.

• Core Values elaborate by providing important performance standards:

1. Efficiency, Effectiveness and Economy.
2. Flexibility and Responsiveness.
3. Professionalism and Respect for Civil Authority.
4. The Rule of Law, Transparency and Accountability.

• "The Defense Department advocates a consultative, collaborative, and participatory approach in its pursuit of its mandate and strives to communicate its efforts inside and outside the organization."

• "The Defense Department, likewise, adheres to the responsible use of power to advance national security interests. It recognizes that those who hold positions of public trust should account for their performance to the public."

These, too, are excellent foundational values. Of note, there are Ombudsman and Audit functions within the Department to police matters. We'd have to explore these areas further to see what kinds of incidents have arisen.

National Defense and Security Policy Goals and Objectives

DND follows through on the mission by pursuing certain goals and objectives assigned by current law:

1. Secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory (Sec 3, Art II, 1987 Constitution);
2. Secure the Republic of the Philippines from direct armed aggression or invasion (RA 7898);
3. Suppress insurgency and other serious threats to internal security (Section 3, RA 8551);
4.  Protect and preserve life and property in times of war or other national emergencies of equally grave character (RA 7898);
5. Assist in social and economic development (EO 292, s-87);
6. Strengthen security alliance and partnership in the Asia-Pacific Region (RA 7898);
7. Assist in fostering international peace and stability (Chapters VI and VII, UN Charter); and,
8.  Modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines to a level where it can actively and fully perform its constitutional mandate (RA 7898).

RA7898 is "The AFP Modernization Act" passed in 1995. Clearly DND takes its orders from the "larger government" of Executive Branch and the Congress. Laws tell it what to do.

DND’s Thrusts

This section outlines "the primary focus of this department to vigorously pursue the needed defense reforms for a transformed National Defense establishment . . ."

1. Upgrading the AFP’s Capability to protect the people "against hostile internal and external forces (AFP’s foremost role) and added roles such as responding to disaster and International peacekeeping and humanitarian operations."  The role assigned AFP to provide disaster relief and support UN initiatives is fairly new, formalized in 1995 via the AFP Modernization Act.
2. Modernization the Government Arsenal
3. Enhancing the Office of Civil Defense (disaster relief)
4. Utilizing the Reserve Force to complement the AFP and the OCD (includes ROTC coordination with schools)
5. Developing the National Defense College of the Philippines
6. Cultivating Synergy with Local Government Units and the Private Sector.
7. Ensuring the Welfare of Veterans

If I were to boil these down, it has two active planks, (1) upgrade defense capabilities and (2) strengthen disaster relief. And it has an administrative thrust. I get the idea that administrative is pretty intense.

Web Site as a Portal to DND

The DND home page is a plasterwork of elements apparently added here and there over time. It is cluttered and some elements duplicate one another. It gives the appearance of comprehensiveness, but if you dig a bit through the various elements, you find it is mostly PDF files copied and thrown onto the page, sometimes outdated, generally not comprehensive (the financials), and occasionally informative. There are pictures of award ceremonies and lots of good words reading the patriotic flair, mom, peach pie, that kind of thing. In other words, publicity puff.

The plan for reform runs from 2004 to 2011 and nothing is there to bring it up to date.

You will find nothing about China or terrorism or NPA or UN peacekeeping or the state of readiness. You will find a lot about conferences and awards.

The Army web site, subordinate to DND, is cleaner but still features award ceremonies and self-tributes. This will be the subject of a separate blog: Army, Navy, Air Force capabilities. But for sure, the military is spending a lot of resources on web self-promotion, and I don't think that contributes much to defense of the Philippines.

The most meaningful document I found on the web site was a 42 page "white paper" dealing with upgrading the AFP. It appears to have been last revised in 2011, but that is not clear. What is clear is the following statement from that document:

• Modernization of the AFP Still Wanting

• The need to “modernize the AFP to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines” has been recognized with the passage of Republic Act 7898 (RA 7898) in late 1995 and the approval of the AFP Modernization Program through Joint Resolution No. 28 of both houses of Congress in February 1996. With a life of fifteen (15) years, the AFPMP has technically ended in 2011 without fully accomplishing the intent and purpose of modernizing the capabilities of the AFP. While the AFPMP required a total of 332 Billion Pesos to fully realize the envisioned capabilities for naval, air, ground, and joint command and control communications and information systems, only 33.9 Billion Pesos was provided up to the end of 2010.12

Evaluation and Conclusions to Part I

I am troubled in that the impression I have from the DND presentation is an organization that is not focused on the hard business of defending the Philippines, but on public relations and the academics and administrative folderol of proving its worth.

Without proving its worth.

I'd guess that the effort to prove worth probably employs way too many people and the business of defense analysis and hard-nosed assessments employs too few. We'll try to get into this a little deeper in a future installment.

Very clearly the mandate set forth in RA7898, enacted in 1995, has not succeeded. It has failed. It was a lost battle. Maybe the expectations were too high for a nation not yet on its economic feet.

Maybe more is happening now, but it does not get transmitted through the clutter of the DND web site.

One gets a feeling of happy warriors from visiting the web site. Not accomplishment or confidence. Yet the facts would read "failure" of the 2004 to 2011 mission.

In reading the white paper on needs, it is clear that the "desires" for improvement are earnest, but they run headlong into the practicality that the Philippines is a poor nation. The allocated budget has amounted to only 10% of the perceived total need.

I simply don't get the impression of "strong fighting force, focused on victory". I get the impression of parades. And I have no idea what external threats are deemed significant by DND. Or how, practically, we will get improvements made when schools are so under-funded, too.

Maybe I'm wrong and continued investigation will shed some optimistic light on things.